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I.

Introduction

Men and boys are targeted for sexual violence during armed conflict or
other forms of mass atrocity, but this fact has received relatively little
attention within the international community.1 The recent conflicts taking
place in Syria and Libya provide stark illustrations of sexual violence
directed against males. For example, the February 2013 report of the United
Nations (UN)-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on Syria examined numerous reports of sexual violence taking place during
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1
Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys” in Anne-Marie
de Brouwer et al, eds, Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2013) 79 at 79, 93 [Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”].
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during the Syrian conflict in two distinct contexts: against women by
government forces and affiliated militia during house searches and at
checkpoints; and against men, boys, women and girls in detention centres as
a means to extract information, humiliate and punish.3 Men and boys in
detention have been raped, and had their genitals electrocuted with live
wires or burned by cigarettes, lighters or melted plastic.4 As well,
government forces used sexual violence as a method of coercion, by
detaining and raping (or threatening to rape) male and female family
members to force male relatives fighting with opposition armed groups to
surrender themselves.5 The UN-appointed International Commission of
Inquiry on Libya highlighted similar stories.6 Male and female victims were
subjected to sexual violence by Qadhafi forces in detention centres to extract
information about the opposition, humiliate and punish.7 As in Syria, the
forms of male sexual violence included anal rape, rape with an instrument,
electrocution of genitals and burning of genitals.8 These examples highlight
the need for more focus within international criminal law on male-targeted
sexual violence.9
This article explores the current state of understanding within
international criminal law of sexual violence directed at men and boys,
particularly as a crime against humanity or a war crime. It begins by
examining how international criminal tribunals have approached maletargeted sexual violence to date, concluding that the tribunals have been
uneven in their approach; even so, these cases have been helpful in creating
the beginnings of a typology of male sexual violence. The article then turns
to identifying three main gaps that must be addressed in order to improve
the ability of international criminal tribunals – and, similarly, domestic
courts prosecuting international crimes - to address this form of sexual
violence.10 The first gap is an information gap: there is a dearth of systematic
data on sexual violence directed against men and boys in armed conflict or
atrocity. The result is that relatively little is known about the prevalence,
patterns and effects of male sexual violence, and less attention is paid to the
issue than should be the case, including in the field of international criminal
law. The second gap can be referred to as a social gap. Men and boys may
not feel able to speak about their experiences or, if they do, they may not
describe themselves as victims of sexual violence. In addition, international
3

Ibid, at paras 106, 108, Annex IX paras 5, 10, 15, Annex X para 13.
Ibid, at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 10-13.
Ibid, at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 11.
6
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,
UNHRCOR, 19th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/19/68, (2012) at paras 65-70 [Libya Commission of
Inquiry Report].
7
Ibid, at para 67.
8
Ibid.
9
This focus should not occur at the expense of attention to female-targeted sexual violence.
Rather, it should occur in addition to an examination of sexual violence against women and
girls, especially given the interrelationship between male- and female-targeted sexual violence:
see Parts 2 and 4, below.
10
While this article focuses on international criminal courts and tribunals, it is important to
recognize that the same concerns and recommendations may also arise in domestic prosecutions
of international crimes.
4
5
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investigators, prosecutors, counsel (whether for victims or defence) and
judges may have difficulty in recognizing sexual violence directed against
men, whether due to certain, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that only
women and girls are the victims of sexual violence; lack of training (of
themselves or of the individuals they speak to or who serve as witnesses); or
assumptions that certain violence, like forced circumcision, castration, penile
amputation or sexual mutilation, is best categorized more generically as
torture, inhumane acts or cruel treatment. The third gap is a legal gap, which
is twofold: a gap in overt recognition and a gap in classification. While rape
has been defined in international criminal law in a gender-neutral way,11
there are other acts of sexual violence visited upon men and boys that are not
explicitly named. This lack of overt recognition can be problematic because
these acts must be prosecuted under other (broader, less descriptive)
headings. When combined with the social gap, the result can be
miscategorization. Sexual violence crimes directed at men and boys have
been legally (re)classified as torture, cruel treatment or inhumane acts,
thereby obscuring the sexual aspects of the harm done to the victims.
A solid understanding of sexual violence directed against men and boys
is crucial for international criminal law. Under the principle of legality,12 it is
important to clarify the contours of this type of sexual violence so that it can
be clearly labeled as a crime.13 As well, a deeper understanding of this form
of sexual violence will help international criminal law’s understanding of all
forms of sexual violence, including sexual violence directed against women
and girls. Sexual violence directed at men and boys is often intertwined with
sexual violence committed against women and girls and is intimately linked
to socially-constructed gender norms. In the context of international criminal
law, increased attention to sexual violence targeted at men and boys will
lead to more accurate explanations by prosecutors of the depth of
victimization of individuals and communities. Therefore, this article ends by
11

See, e.g. the definition in the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes document:
International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) at arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 [ICC “Elements of
Crimes”].
12
Under the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), criminal conduct must
have been laid down as clearly as possible in a written or unwritten form before the crime was
committed: Gerhard Werle, “General Principles of International Criminal Law” in Antonio
Cassese, ed, The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009) 54 at 55.
13
This is exactly what has been happening over the past two decades with sexual and genderbased violence directed against women and girls. Like sexual violence targeted at males, sexual
violence directed at females was largely overlooked or ignored for centuries: Radhika
Coomaraswamy, “Sexual Violence During Wartime” in Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd, eds,
Listening to the Silences: Women and War (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 53 at 53.
Labeling something as a violation of the law is an important expressive tool for revealing
otherwise hidden harm: Rebecca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational
Legal Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) at 39. Note that
international criminal law does not yet have a standardized definition of rape, which may pose a
challenge to clearly labeling rape (whether of men, boys, women or girls) as a crime in certain
circumstances as different definitions are more, or less, inclusive: see, e.g. Valerie Oosterveld,
“Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (2012) 19:1 William &
Mary Journal of Women and the Law, 7 at 12-13.
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discussing what needs to be done in order to translate what is known about
sexual violence targeted against men and boys into successful international
prosecutions.

II.

Recognition by International Criminal Tribunals of
Male-Targeted Sexual Violence

Sexual violence directed against men and boys in armed conflict and
other forms of mass atrocity has rarely been prosecuted in international
courts and tribunals, but there is some case law providing a helpful basis for
future prosecutions. Much of this case law stems from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely from cases
dealing with events at detention facilities.14 The ICTY recorded in evidence
various types of male sexual violence such as anal rape with objects,15 forced
fellatio between detainees (including in front of other detainees),16 forced
fellatio of a detainee on an accused,17 beatings on genitals,18 and placing a lit
fuse around the genitals of a detainee.19 The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone also contributed some – albeit less than the ICTY supportive jurisprudence. The usefulness of the legal discussion varies,
however, because these tribunals have been very inconsistent in their
consideration of male sexual violence.20 This lack of consistency suggests
there has been, or there is currently, no overarching or coherent prosecutorial
policy, or consistent judicial analysis, on how to approach this form of sexual
violence.
The first inconsistency occurs in the charging – or failure to charge – rape
and other forms of sexual violence against men and boys as such. Rape is the
only form of sexual violence explicitly listed in each of the Statutes of the

14

For a discussion on the ICTY’s statistics on the prosecution of male sexual violence, see Kirsten
Campbell, “The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (2007) 1 Int’l J Transitional Justice 411 at 422-427.
15
Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić, IT-95-9-T, Judgment (17 October 2003) at para 728 (International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) [Simić Trial Judgment].
16
Ibid; Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajisnik, IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment (27 September 2006) at para 304
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I) [Krajisnik Trial
Judgment].
17
Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at para 728.
18
Ibid, at paras 695, 697, 698, 771; Prosecutor v Radoslav Br#anin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1
September 2004) para 498 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber III) [Br#anin Trial Judgment].
19
Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić et al, IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment (16 November 1998) paras 10351040 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) [Mucić et al
Trial Judgment].
20
Sivakumaran describes how the cases of the international criminal courts and tribunals tend to
fall into three categories: (a) where sexual violence against men and boys is mentioned but not
characterized as sexual violence; (b) where the sexual violence is mentioned and properly
categorized as such but without any consequences attached to the violence; and (c) where the
sexual violence is recognized as such and consequences (i.e. convictions) are attached to this
violence: Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation: UN responses to sexual violence against
men and boys in situations of armed conflict” (2010) 92:877 International Review of the Red
Cross 259 at 272 [Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”].
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ICTY, ICTR, ICC and Special Court for Sierra Leone.21 It is defined by these
tribunals in a gender-neutral manner, and therefore captures male and
female rape.22 The ICC has charged rape of men. In the Bemba case, involving
acts committed in the Central African Republic, the confirmation of charges
decision describes a man raped in succession by three soldiers in his house in
the presence of his three wives and children.23 His two daughters were also
raped in his presence.24 These incidents were charged as rape.25 Rape of men
was also prosecuted as such at the ICTY.26 In Češić, the accused was
convicted of rape for forcing two Muslim brothers to perform fellatio in front
of the other prisoners.27 Conversely, in Mucić the ICTY prosecutor charged
forced fellatio between two detained brothers as the grave breach of
inhuman treatment and cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and
customs of war.28 The Trial Chamber responded that this “act could
constitute rape for which liability could have been found if pleaded in the
appropriate manner”.29 Similarly, in the ICTY’s Simić case, anal rape of a
male victim with a police truncheon, and forced oral sex between two male
prisoners (as well as between a male prisoner and a perpetrator) was not
considered specifically as rape, but more generally as “sexual assaults”

21

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNSC Res 827, UNSCOR,
48th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/827, (1993), art 5(g); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, UNSC Res 955, UNSCOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/955, (1994), arts 3(g) and 4(e); Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9, (1998), arts 7(1)(g),
8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) [Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 138 (entered into
force 12 April 2002), arts 2(g) and 3(e) [Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute].
22
See e.g. ICC “Elements of Crimes”, supra note 11 at arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1;
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) at para 598
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber) [Akayesu Trial Judgment];
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (22 February 2001) at
para 460 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II [Kunarac
et al Trial Judgment], followed in Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima et al, SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (20
June 2007) at para 963 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II) [AFRC Trial Judgment].
23
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
(15 June 2009) at para 171 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II) [Bemba
Confirmation of Charges].
24
Ibid, at para 172.
25
Ibid, at para 159. See also Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Public
Redacted Version of Amended Document Containing the Charges Filed on 30 March 2009 (30
March 2009) at para 39 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II).
26
Campbell notes that the four counts of male rape charged as rape at the ICTY involve fellatio
rather than anal penetration: Campbell, supra note 14 at 427.
27
Prosecutor v Ranko Češić, IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (11 March 2004) at paras 13-14, 33
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I) [Češić Trial
Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v Stevan Todorovic, IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (31 July
2001) paras 39-40 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber)
[Todorovic Sentencing Judgment]. See also Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at
275.
28
Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1060. See also Todorovic Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 27 at paras 17, 39-40, 66 (sexual assault as persecution). See also Sivakumaran, “Lost
in Translation”, supra note 20 at 275.
29
Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1066.
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amounting to torture and persecution.30 As well, in Krajisnik, the ICTY Trial
Chamber found that Muslim and Croat male detainees were repeatedly
“forced to engage in degrading sexual acts with each other in the presence of
other detainees”.31 This was classified as inhumane treatment under the
crime against humanity of persecution.32 The better approach is to charge
rape as rape, in addition to other forms of harm (if the rape also fulfills the
elements of crime for those other forms). When rape is categorized solely
under non-rape categories, the sexual nature of the harm is obscured and
therefore potentially lost when determining liability. As Erikkson
convincingly notes, it is important to understand rape as a sexual
manifestation of aggression because this leads to greater acknowledgement
of the modes used to subjugate an enemy group in armed conflict or other
forms of atrocity.33
Prosecutors within international criminal courts and tribunals sometimes
fail to charge male sexual violence (other than rape) at all. For example, in
Br#anin, the ICTY Trial Chamber considered evidence of an elderly man
being forced under threat to rape a female detainee at Omarska camp, but
only considered that this was a violation against the female detainee.34 This
can be contrasted with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which considered
such acts as violations against both of the victims.35 Another example comes
from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where the Prosecutor restricted the
indictments against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leaders, and Charles Taylor (former
President of Liberia), to sexual violence directed against “civilian women
and girls”.36 Evidence of sexual violence directed against men and boys arose
during the trials in all three cases, but the Trial Chamber in the AFRC and
Taylor cases felt constrained by the indictment to attach no consequences to
the evidence.37 In contrast, the Trial Chamber in the RUF case felt that the
defect in the indictment had been cured and considered evidence of forced
rape between male and female civilian captives, slicing of the sexual organs
of male and female captives, forced male nudity, and the harm inherent in
30

Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at paras 728, 772.
Krajisnik Trial Judgment, supra note 16 at paras 304, 800.
Ibid, at paras 745, 1126.
33
Maria Eriksson, Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States Under International Law? (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) at 58.
34
Br#anin Trial Judgment, supra note 18 at para 516.
35
Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay et al, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (2 March 2009) at paras 1205, 12078 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I) [RUF Trial Judgment].
36
Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima et al, SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment
(18 February 2005) at paras 51-57 (Special Court for Sierra Leone); Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay
et al, SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment (2 August 2006) at paras 5460 (Special Court for Sierra Leone); Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s
Second Amended Indictment (29 May 2007) at paras 14-17 (Special Court for Sierra Leone).
37
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at paras 968-969; Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T,
Judgment (18 May 2012) at paras 124-134 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II)
[Taylor Trial Judgment]. Similarly, in Bagosora, the court heard evidence that amputated genitals
of men were seen at roadblocks, but this was only considered as background information as the
indictment contained no charges related to this: Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T,
Judgment and Sentence (18 December 2008) at para 1908 (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Trial Chamber I). See also Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 274.
31
32
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forcing a husband to watch the rape and subsequent death of his wife.38 In a
somewhat different iteration, sometimes judges do not seize the opportunity
presented to highlight particular acts as sexual violence. For example, the
ICTR heard evidence in Muhimana that a particular victim’s genitals were
amputated and hung on a pole, but the Trial Chamber ignored this aspect of
the victim’s death and concentrated on his shooting and subsequent
beheading in the context of his murder.39
Related to this issue, prosecutors within international criminal courts
and tribunals sometimes fail to charge male sexual violence (other than rape)
as such. There are a number of explanations,40 but the fact that only the
Statutes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC contain explicit
reference to forms of sexual violence other than rape, such as sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, and “any other form of sexual violence” as a residual
category,41 is a significant legal issue. Thus, the ICTY and ICTR Prosecutors
were required to slot this evidence under other categories – usually the crime
against humanity or war crime of torture, the crime against humanity of
inhumane treatment or the war crime of cruel treatment.42 While recognizing
that this has undoubtedly constrained the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution
and judges still had room to manoeuvre, in that they could describe how
these seemingly non-sexual prohibited acts were committed in a sexual
manner. However, the tribunals have been unpredictable in terms of
whether and how they explain the sexual nature of the acts. For example, in
the ICTY’s Simić case, a victim was beaten in the crotch and told “Muslims
should not propagate”.43 Another was kicked in the genital area.44 This was
referred to under the heading of “beatings, torture, forced labour and
confinement under inhumane conditions” and was not referred to as sexual
violence.45 Rather, it was categorized as cruel and inhumane treatment as an
underlying act of persecution.46 In Mucić, the ICTY Trial Chamber
characterized the placing of a lit fuse around the genitals of a male detainee
as “physical mistreatment”47 and as causing “serious pain and injury”48
qualifying as cruel treatment and wilfully causing great suffering and injury,
but not as sexual violence.49 In a recent example, the ICTY Trial Chamber, in
Stanišić and Župljanin, considered sexual violence directed against Muslim
men, including sexual humiliation; the stomping of genitals; forced nudity;
38

RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at paras 1304, 1308, 1194, 1207, 1208, 1210, 1307, 1067, 1347.
Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and Sentence (28 April 2005) paras
442-444, 448 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber III); Sivakumaran,
“Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 274.
40
Social assumptions will be examined in Part 3, below.
41
Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 21 at art 2(g). The Rome Statute also includes
mention of enforced sterilization: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at arts 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii),
8(2)(e)(vi).
42
Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict” (2007) 18:2
European Journal of International Law 253 at 256 [Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”].
43
Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at para 697.
44
Ibid, at para 698.
45
Ibid, at 198.
46
Ibid, at para 771.
47
Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1037.
48
Ibid, at 1039.
49
Ibid, at paras. 1035, 1037, 1038, 1039.
39
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forced rape (including forced penetration by a broom handle) and other
sexual acts between two pairs of fathers and sons and one pair of cousins;
and penile amputation (then forcing other prisoners to ingest the penis).50
Some of these acts were referred to directly as “sexual violence”51 while
others were not. All were considered under charges of torture (as a crime
against humanity and a war crime), cruel treatment (as a war crime) and
inhumane treatment (as a crime against humanity) and as constituent aspects
of persecution.52 In the ICTR’s case of Niyitegeka, the accused was convicted
of aiding and abetting an incident in which a man’s genitals were amputated
and displayed in the context of his murder, and this was characterized as an
inhumane act of sexual violence.53 In the ICTY case of Stakić, the accused was
found guilty of the crime against humanity of persecution based on – and
characterized as - sexual assault on male detainees.54 Similarly, in Todorovic,
genital beatings and ordering a detainee to bite another detainee’s penis
were considered by the ICTY to be sexual assaults and therefore underlying
acts of persecution.55
Finally, international criminal courts and tribunals appear unsure how to
address secondary victimization as a result of sexual violence: is it a form of
sexual violence in and of itself, or is it mainly something else, such as a form
of psychological torture?56 For example, in the ICTY’s Furundžija case, a
woman was raped and sexually assaulted and her male friend was forced to
watch “in order to force him to admit allegations made against her”.57 The
Tribunal concluded that both witnesses were “subjected to severe physical
and mental suffering”, and therefore torture.58 The Trial Chamber in Stanišić
and Župljanin also considered the harm inherent in forcing a man to watch a
female relative being raped, similarly considering this as evidence of torture,
inhumane acts and persecution.59 The Special Court for Sierra Leone
recognized the harm caused by RUF fighters forcing a man to watch the rape
and death of his wife, and considered this an aspect of fomenting terror by
sexual means.60 To arrive at a consistent international criminal legal
approach, deeper consideration of this form of victimization is needed.
50

Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-T (Vol I) (27 March 2013) at paras 1221,
1235, 1599, 1663 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II)
[Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgment].
51
Ibid, at para 1560.
52
Ibid, at paras 1221, 1235, 1246, 1248-1250, 1560, 1685, 1687-1690.
53
Prosecutor v Eliezer Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence (16 May 2003) paras 462467, 303, 312, 462 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I) [Niyitegeka Trial
Judgment].
54
Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Judgment (31 July 2003) paras. 228, 236, 241, 617
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II). See also
Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 275.
55
Todorovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 27 at para 38.
56
For a discussion of this, see R Charli Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against
Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations” (2006) 37:1 Security Dialogue, 83 at 96-97.
57
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (10 December 1998) para 127
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber). See also para 267
for a description of the effect of forced viewing of sexual violence.
58
Ibid, at 129, 267.
59
Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgment, supra note 50 at para 1214.
60
RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at para 1347.
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The recognition by international courts and tribunals of various forms of
sexual violence directed against men and boys is important and helps shed
light on generally overlooked forms of sexual violence, including similar
violence directed against women and girls. Yet, the incoherent approach
taken by and within various tribunals raises serious concerns. Male sexual
violence is not consistently and accurately being labeled as such. This
obscures the sexual nature of the prohibited acts.61 It also perpetuates the
inaccurate stereotype that sexual violence is a crime that only affects women
and girls and overlooks male sexual violence.62 In comparison, violence
directed against women and girls is more likely to be directly categorized as
sexual - sometimes there is an intense focus on the sexual aspects, to the
detriment of including or recognizing other forms of female victimization.63
Campbell notes that the ICTY’s Prosecutor has been more likely to charge
rape of female victims than of male victims; as a result, there is a pattern
where “men appear to testify to conflict and women testify to rape”.64 The
treatment of male sexual violence sometimes as sexual violence, and
sometimes simply as violence, creates ambiguity and undermines the
potential for positive expressivism in international criminal law.65 Clear
prosecutorial policy on how to address male sexual violence is needed. This
policy needs to not only address how to bring consistency to the
prosecutorial approach, but also how to address the factual, social and legal
gaps outlined in the following sections.

III.

International Criminal Law and the Factual Gap on
Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys

As awareness slowly builds that men and boys are also victims of sexual
violence in armed conflicts and other forms of mass atrocity, more reports
are recording incidents of this type of violence.66 These reports are helpful,
61
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files/resources/SR323.pdf>.
64
Campbell, supra note 14 at 425.
65
On expressivism in international criminal law, see Margaret M. deGuzman, “An Expressive
Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes” in Morten Bergsmo, Thematic Prosecution
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but they tend to be anecdotal. Where there happen to be multiple reports,
“male sexual violence has been recognized as regular and unexceptional,
pervasive and widespread”.67 That said, it is relatively rare for the incidence
of male sexual violence during conflict or other situations of mass atrocity to
be studied in particular conflicts, let alone across conflicts.68 For example,
Sivakumaran outlines only two prevalence studies, from BosniaHerzegovina and Liberia,69and Cohen et al. point to only two studies on
wartime sexual violence against men in which the surveyors asked about the
sex of the perpetrator and the sex of the victim – one from Sierra Leone and
one from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.70 This dearth of systematic
data on male victimization is problematic: it “demonstrates that pervasive
gendered expectations about women’s and men’s roles [with women as the
only victims and men solely as perpetrators] during wartime prevent
researchers and policymakers alike from robustly analyzing questions of
wartime sexual violence.”71 More specific to the theme of this article, lack of
survey data on particular armed conflicts also hampers international
prosecutors and victims’ counsel from presenting non-victim/witnessprovided evidence of male sexual violence – evidence that could be helpful
in explaining the occurrence, the context and the pattern of the crimes to the
judges.72 Thus, more study is certainly needed,73 and may help to explain not
only the forms and patterns of male sexual violence in specific conflicts, but
also shed light on “the causes of sexual violence against men, and why men
may be targeted in some contexts but not others.”74 That said, underreporting by victims due to fear, shame, stigma, confusion, guilt and loss of
masculinity is likely to remain an issue, and this must be taken into
account.75
associated footnotes [noting at 259 that most studies come from medical literature and reports of
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Patel, supra note 66 at 425-430.
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Despite this factual gap and the need for further and deeper analysis,
two important lessons emerge. First, the reports available help set out a
preliminary explanation of reasons and a typology of sexual violence against
men and boys. They also show how the types of violence used vary from
situation to situation. The reports seem to illustrate that sexual violence
directed against men and boys is meant to achieve similar ends as sexual
violence directed against women and girls:76 to assert domination, to
terrorize,77 to coerce,78 to humiliate and degrade, to prevent procreation by
the victims (of their ethnicity or culture), and to disempower.79 Indeed,
sexual violence directed against men and boys is similarly rooted in the
hegemonic masculinity of war.80 In addition, male sexual violence may be
committed for different reasons than female sexual violence: specifically, “to
cast aspersions of homosexuality” and to emasculate.81 Sivakumaran
helpfully grouped accounts of male sexual violence under different
headings: rape (by body parts or objects), including forced fellatio and forced
rape between two victims (both male or male and female), and threat of
rape;82 enforced sterilization and sexual mutilation, such as castration or
penile amputation;83 genital violence, such as beatings or electrocution;84
forced nudity, either as a prelude to rape or other forms of sexual violence or
to sexually humiliate;85 forced masturbation;86 and sexual slavery.87 This
typology assists in demonstrating that male sexual abuse is not only about
rape: indeed, “insofar as men and boys are concerned, [rape] may not be the
predominant form of sexual violence committed against them.”88
Investigators, prosecutors, counsel (victims’ and defence) and judges need to
be alert to potential differences between, and within, conflicts of types of
sexual violence, as well as potential differences in the location of male and
female sexual violence. Men and boys are most likely to experience sexual
violence during conflict or atrocity while in detention, or as prisoners of war
or members of armed forces or armed groups (including as boy soldiers).89
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The available information suggests a variation in extent and form of both
female and male sexual violence, and therefore, not all types of sexual
violence are applicable in all conflicts or situations of atrocity. It is not clear,
however, why some forms of sexual violence occur more in some contexts
than in others.90
The second lesson that emerges from available reports is that male and
female sexual violence are clearly interlinked.91 For example, in Syria, sexual
violence is used as a tool against both male and female detainees to coerce
male opposition fighters to turn themselves in.92 This conclusion is also
reflected in international cases – the ICC’s Bemba example above showed
how rape of a male head of household was interconnected with the rape of
his two daughters, likely to enhance the expression of domination by the
perpetrators over the entire household.93 In Sierra Leone, the jurisprudence
demonstrated that the rebels intentionally used sexual violence against both
males and females – simultaneously or in combination - to terrorize
civilians.94 Sivakumaran argues that the connections between the two forms
of sexual violence require that both types should be subjected to similar
analytical rubrics because “the dynamics, the constructions of masculinity
and femininity and the stereotypes involved are similar.”95 Thus,
consideration of them together by international investigators, prosecutors
and victims’ counsel may lead to a more nuanced consideration in the
jurisprudence of the roles of men and women in armed conflict and
“ignoring it may mean missing out on a vital component of the issue”96
In sum, the lack of in-depth and prevalence reporting on male sexual
violence in atrocity and conflict encumbers international criminal law’s
understanding of this form of sexual violence: lack of reporting may lead
international investigators to incorrectly overlook male sexual violence as a
possible crime in the situation at hand. Therefore, more consistent reporting
on the occurrence, forms, patterns and prevalence of male sexual violence
could assist international investigators, prosecutors, victims’ and defence
counsel, and judges, leading to increased legal recognition of these
violations. The reports presently available for some conflicts assist
to be aware that the types of witnesses chosen can influence the likelihood of demonstrating
male sexual violence, especially in detention: Campbell notes the ICTY’s relatively positive
record in prosecuting sexual violence directed against male victims is “in clear contrast to the
general lack of visibility of male sexual assault in the Yugoslavian conflict; both in terms of
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90
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international investigators and lawyers in understanding the typology of
male sexual violence, and the linkages between male and female sexual
violence, but the understanding of these is still rudimentary.

IV.

International Criminal Law and the Social Gap on Sexual
Violence Directed Against Men and Boys

The gap in reporting on, and therefore deep analysis of, male sexual
violence is compounded by what may be referred to as a ‘social’ gap. There
are two aspects to that gap: the difficulties that exist for men and boys to
understand and report their sexual victimization, and the challenges others
(including investigators, prosecutors, victims’ and defence counsel, and
judges) may have in recognizing male sexual violence.
It is suspected that male victims of sexual violence significantly underreport their victimization “due to a combination of shame, confusion, guilt,
fear and stigma”.97 They may feel unable to reveal their mistreatment
because they feel overwhelmed by the other aspects of their life due to
displacement, insecurity and chaotic state systems, or because there is simply
no place or institution (whether medical, legal or otherwise) to which to
report.98 Masculine gender norms of aggression and protection tend to be
exaggerated or heightened during times of conflict or atrocity.99 Thus, male
victims of sexual violence may feel even more reluctant to report sexual
violence than they do during peacetime, as they may feel like they have
failed to accord with those cultural norms of manhood (both in being
attacked and in being able to cope ‘like a man’).100 As well, men and boys
may feel unable to reveal their emotions due to these same cultural gender
norms.101 Even if they do feel able to reveal their victimization, they may not
be able to express themselves adequately if their culture lacks phrases to
describe male sexual violence.102 They may not view their victimization as
sexual in nature, either because they have adopted a societal assumption that
males cannot be raped (or be the victim of sexual abuse),103 or because the
sexual violence was accompanied by many other kinds of violence and thus
may be considered as one of a number of forms of beating or torture.104 All of
these difficulties deserve consideration in formulating overarching
prosecutorial policy toward male sexual violence, and in approaching
investigation and prosecution of male sexual violence in particular cases.
The second aspect of the social gap is that investigators, prosecutors,
victims’ and defence counsel, and judges may face challenges in recognizing
male sexual violence. First, those on the ground — such as investigators and
97

Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Male/Male Rape and the “Taint” of Homosexuality” (2005) 27
Human Rights Quarterly 1274 at 1288; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 255.
98
Solangon and Patel, supra note 66 at 424.
99
Ní Aoláin et al, supra note 63 at 49-55.
100
Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 255.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid, at 255-256. Indeed, we have seen this with female sexual violence, where many cultures
use euphemisms to describe rape: e.g. Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at paras 152-154.
103
This may be because the domestic law does not recognize male sexual abuse, especially rape,
as such: see examples in Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 82-83.
104
Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 256.

(*)" '()*+,-!(.!/+01*+,02(+,-!3,4!,+5!/+01*+,02(+,-!61-,02(+7!
those individuals the investigators speak to, like medical and humanitarian
personnel — may assume men are not as susceptible to sexual violence, and
therefore may pay less attention to detecting signs of this violence than they
would when speaking with women and girls.105 Second, these individuals
may not be trained to recognize signs of male sexual violence, or may
incorrectly assume that only rape qualifies as sexual violence.106 Third, if the
violence is recognized (for example, castration), then it may not be seen as
sexual in nature, but rather simply as mutilation or torture, thereby
reinforcing the view that only women and girls may be the victims of sexual
violence.107 This gap is seen in an example related to the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. As mentioned earlier, when the Prosecutor drafted the
indictments containing sexual violence charges, all of these charges were cast
as occurring only to women and girls: an assumption disproven by evidence
arising during the AFRC, RUF and Taylor trials.108 Finally, female sexual
violence (especially rape) is sometimes incorrectly understood as acts that
are personal in nature and separate from the main activity of war.109 It may
be that this same assumption is being applied to male sexual violence,
depending on the scenario. Therefore, there is a risk that investigators,
prosecutors, victims’ and defence counsel, and judges may be more likely to
(incorrectly) conclude that sexual violence crimes are ‘opportunistic’ and
disconnected from the prevailing context than they are to reach the same
conclusions for other violent crimes.110
International criminal tribunals alone cannot fix the factual gap or the
social gap. However, international investigators, prosecutors and counsel
need to be aware of these gaps and adopt strategies such as: encouraging and
supporting the reporting and study of male sexual violence; training staff to
overcome ingrained social and cultural assumptions about male sexual
violence and to gain knowledge of, and experience in, detecting such
violence;111 working to reduce retraumatization of male sexual violence
victims in interviews;112 and ensuring that male sexual violence survivors are
able to access psycho-social and other supports.113 These changes would
undoubtedly serve to fill the legal gaps outlined in the next section.

V.

International Criminal Law and Legal Gaps on Sexual
Violence Directed Against Men and Boys

There are two types of legal gaps within international criminal law that
hamper a clearer understanding of sexual violence directed against men and
boys during conflict and times of other atrocity. The first gap is one of overt
legal recognition for certain forms of sexual violence commonly directed
105
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against men and boys. On the one hand, there is recognition within
international criminal law that anyone may be raped. The act of rape,
whether as a crime against humanity or a war crime, has been defined in a
neutral manner to capture rape committed against women, girls, men and
boys. For example, one of the most widely-used definitions of rape in the
ICTY and ICTR is: “the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina
or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used
by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the
victim.”114 Other definitions are similarly inclusive.115 On the other hand,
other modes of sexual violence commonly directed against men and boys –
such as forced circumcision, penile amputation, castration, sexual mutilation
(for example, burning of the genitals) and genital electrocution – are not
explicitly listed in any international criminal statute or treaty.116 It is
understandable that every specific form of sexual violence cannot be listed,
which is why the residual category of other forms of sexual violence was
included in the Rome Statute. However, this lack of overt recognition has
meant that prosecutors and judges have sometimes entirely overlooked these
forms of violence (as illustrated in the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s RUF
and Taylor cases, discussed above),117 have classified the acts as something
other than sexual violence,118 or where they have recognized the violence as
sexual, their attempts at classification as sexual violence have been
rebuffed.119
The second gap in international criminal law is related: while the term
‘sexual violence’ has been defined by international criminal tribunals, the
word ‘sexual’ – obviously integral to the definition – is not well understood,
resulting in misunderstandings. The term ‘sexual violence’ was first defined
by the ICTR and later confirmed by the ICTY as:
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve
penetration or even physical contact.120

However, the term ‘sexual’ was not defined, and this is also the case in
the ICC’s Elements of Crimes document.121 In order to articulate what type of
114
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violence qualifies as sexual, the ICTY and ICTR have provided examples,
such as forced public nudity,122 sexual mutilation,123 and forced abortion.124
Perhaps the most detailed definition of sexual violence in the
international criminal legal sphere – and therefore the definition closest to
indicating the meaning(s) of ‘sexual’ – is that of the UN Special Rapporteur
on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices: “any violence,
physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting
sexuality”.125 This includes “both physical and psychological attacks directed
against a person’s sexual characteristics, such as forcing a person to strip
naked in public, mutilating a person’s genitals, or slicing off a woman’s
breasts” and “situations in which two victims are forced to perform sexual
acts on one another or to harm each other in a sexual manner”.126 While the
Special Rapporteur’s definition does not directly define ‘sexual’, it is helpful
in capturing the meaning(s) of ‘sexual’.127 She identifies three ways in which
physical or psychological violence may be deemed to be sexual: first, by
targeting a victim’s sexual characteristics such as body parts128 (like breasts,
vaginas, testicles or penises); second, when the perpetrator uses sexual
means to carry out the violence129 (such as humiliating an individual by
placing the perpetrator’s penis in the victim’s mouth, or forcing two victims
to perform sexual acts); or third, by targeting sexuality130 (a victim’s virginity,
or virility, for example). This nuanced explanation of sexual violence
indicates that what is ‘sexual’ must also be similarly nuanced. In other
words, sexual violence is not about sex per se, but it is about body parts and
socially-constructed norms of what is ‘sexual’ (for example, social norms that
link the virginity of unmarried girls and women with a family’s honour).131 It
would be helpful for international courts and tribunals to consider more
comprehensively what makes certain kinds of violence sexual, in order to
capture the relevant physical, sociological and psychological aspects.
An example of how both gaps – in overt recognition and in
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understanding the sexual aspect of sexual violence – can unfortunately
reinforce each other, thereby leading to the non-recognition of the sexual
aspect of male-targeted sexual violence, occurred in an ICC case related to
the post-election violence in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. In the
Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor sought to charge the crime against humanity of
‘other forms of sexual violence’132 in relation to the forced circumcision of
Luo men.133 Pre-Trial Chamber II, in considering which charges would be
included in the Summons to Appear, rejected the Prosecutor’s categorization.
It found “the acts of forcible circumcision cannot be considered acts of a
“sexual nature” as required by the Elements of Crimes” and are “more
properly” listed under the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane
acts’.134 The Pre-Trial Chamber reached this conclusion “in light of the
serious injury to body that the forcible circumcision causes and in view of its
character, similar to other underlying acts constituting crimes against
humanity.”135 While this explanation is somewhat unclear, it appears the PreTrial Chamber felt that forcible circumcision was not ‘sexual’ enough to
qualify as a form of sexual violence, and that the violence done to the men
was more analogous to a physical injury on any other part of the body.
The Prosecutor disagreed with this recategorization and, at the next
stage confirming the charges, tried to explain why ‘other forms of sexual
violence’ was a more appropriate category than ‘other inhumane acts’. First,
the prosecution tried to broaden the Pre-Trial Chamber’s understanding of
how men and boys136 were targeted for various forms of sexual violence,
pointing out that they not only suffered forced circumcision and penile
amputation, they also suffered rape,137 forced nudity and/or sexual
mutilation.138 In other words, the overarching context of the forced
circumcision and penile amputation was one where other forms of sexual
violence also occurred. The Prosecutor also explained that other forms of
violence, such as murder, accompanied these forms of sexual violence.139
Unfortunately, this wider understanding of the context of male sexual
violence may have been lost, as the Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to focus its
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Confirmation of Charges analysis of rape on female victims,140 and its
analysis of male victims on forced circumcision and penile amputation (but
not sexual mutilation or forced nudity).141 Second, the prosecution tried to
explain why these acts should be viewed as a form of sexual violence, rather
than obscured under the heading of inhumane acts.142 The prosecution
explained how the sexuality of the Luo men was targeted by attempting to
target their virility: “these weren’t just attacks on men’s sexual organs as
such but were intended as attacks on men’s identities as men within their
society and were designed to destroy their masculinity”.143 In other words,
the prosecution attempted to engage the third prong of the Special
Rapporteur’s definition. That said, the prosecution’s explanation was not as
fulsome as it could have been, jumping from sexual organs to gender
without stopping in the middle to make the link to sexual norms. The acts
were sexual in nature not only because a sexual organ was targeted, but also
because of the sexualized cultural norms attached to circumcision or noncircumcision of the organ. Luo men and boys were targeted for forced
circumcision and other acts for complex reasons, including to humiliate their
sexual status within their own society.
The response of the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it understood the
Prosecutor’s argument to be that an act of violence is ‘sexual’ if it targets a
‘sexual’ body part and it rejected this approach: “not every act of violence
which targets parts of the body associated with sexuality should be
considered an act of sexual violence.”144 The Pre-Trial Chamber ascribed a
different meaning to the attacks than that proposed by the Prosecutor – “it
appears from the evidence that the acts were motivated by ethnic prejudice
and intended to demonstrate cultural superiority of one tribe over the
other”145 – but without considering whether multiple motivations, including
a motivation relating to humiliation of sexual status, can be considered. Both
the explanations of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber are likely
correct146 because both describe the purpose of the acts. However, the PreTrial Chamber’s approach overlooked the specific role norms around
circumcision (as a trigger for sexual and cultural manhood) played within
140
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the political and ethnic context of the acts.147 The Pre-Trial Chamber also
offered no explanation as to when the Special Rapporteur’s first category of
sexual violence – targeting a victim’s sexual characteristics such as body
parts – would not apply. The Pre-Trial Chamber thus recategorized forced
circumcision and penile amputation under the crime against humanity of
‘other inhumane acts’, thereby prioritizing evidence of physical injury and
motives related to ethnic prejudice while ignoring the evidence relating the
perpetrators’ use of cultural norms of sexuality to dominate Luo males.148
The lack of signalling in the Rome Statute that forced circumcision and
penile amputations may be considered as sexual violence, combined with an
under-articulated argument by the Prosecutor as to why exactly the acts
qualified as ‘sexual’, led to a poor result: an under-reasoned decision by the
judges on why exactly the acts did not qualify as ‘sexual’ (essentially leaving
the categorization to ‘I know it when I see it’).149
These gaps in overt codification and in categorization are heightened
when international prosecutors and criminal tribunals fail to understand the
interconnected nature of sexual violence. As discussed in Part 2 above,
sexual violence directed against men and boys is often closely related to
sexual violence directed against women and girls, regardless of whether it is
committed by an ‘enemy’ or one’s own ‘side’. However, male-directed sexual
violence has sometimes been perceived as different, and therefore separate,
from sexual violence directed against women and girls. In the ICC’s Kenyatta
case, the prosecution attempted to demonstrate that these forms of violence
were intertwined:
In committing rape and mutilation of genital organs, individuals are
assaulted and wounded in ways that are socially gendered, in their identities
as women and men as such, and in the social roles that they occupy, identify
with, and anticipate filling as gendered members of their communities.
Women who were gang raped were violated, humiliated, desecrated so as to
lower their status and deprive them of their dignity and equality as human
beings and, for some of them, to reduce their value as wives or potential
wives. Men who were castrated were deprived of their manhood and
debased in front of their families.150

However, the Pre-Trial Chamber separated its consideration of forced
circumcision and penile amputation from that of rape, exclusively focused
on rape of females, and did not address forced nudity and sexual
mutilation.151 Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber missed the opportunity to
147
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examine how the integration of these forms of violence advanced the
overarching crimes against humanity requirements.152
The legal gaps can be filled. The gap in overt recognition can be rectified
in two ways: first, the statutes of any future tribunal or court applying
international criminal law should include examples of sexual violence
typically targeted at men and boys in the list of sexual violence crimes, such
as forced circumcision, penile amputation or forced castration.153 Second,
prosecutors, investigators, and victims’ and defence counsel need to become
more knowledgeable about what ‘sexual’ means and how this applies to acts
done to men and boys. If implemented, the legal recognition and
categorization of male sexual violence is likely to become more consistent,
which should, in turn, positively influence the manner in which judges
understand the cases. This will help international criminal law move beyond
the current ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to identifying violence against
men and boys as sexual.

VI.

Conclusion

International criminal law is still at a very early stage in its
understanding of sexual violence directed against men and boys during
conflict and other forms of atrocity. This explains the inconsistent
approaches to the issue between, and within, international criminal courts
and tribunals that tend to obscure the sexual nature of the violence.
However, the preliminary nature of international analysis of the issue also
presents an ideal opportunity for the creation of informed prosecutorial
policy to positively influence future prosecutions. While the mandates of the
ICTY, ICTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone will soon be ending,154 the
International Criminal Court is a permanent institution. The Prosecutor of
the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has announced that her office is preparing a
‘gender justice’ policy paper.155 Once it is prepared, she intends to circulate
characterized sexual violence against males and females as a “powerful form of destruction”:
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the draft paper to the international community for comment.156 This presents
an excellent opportunity to ensure the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor
embraces an educated approach to the scourge of male sexual violence. Such
a policy could help create consistency in how the ICC’s Office of the
Prosecutor understands, investigates, classifies, explains and charges male
sexual violence. This consistency would, hopefully, lead to regular,
thoughtful and more precise judicial analysis.157
The ICC Prosecutor’s gender justice policy paper needs to grapple with
the three gaps identified in this article. First, there are significant challenges
in securing data explaining the forms, patterns and levels of incidence of
male sexual violence in conflict or atrocity. This means prosecutors do not
have information that would help to demonstrate that, for example, male
sexual violence was part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.158 Thus, the ICC may wish to encourage
academic, nongovernmental or intergovernmental organizations with
experience in surveying to undertake such data collection in ICC situation
countries. That said, reports that do exist are helpful in policy formation in
that they demonstrate types of, and motivations behind, male sexual
violence that may be helpful in training investigators and prosecutions, and
in explaining male sexual violence to judges. In addition, these reports and
tribunal jurisprudence to date demonstrate the interlinked nature of male
and female sexual violence, which can again be used in training within the
Office of the Prosecutor and in explaining the context of sexual violence in
judicial briefs.
The second gap – termed a social gap – must also inform the ICC
Prosecutor’s gender justice policy paper. The policy must be aware of the
barriers faced by men and boys that are disincentives to revealing their
victimization. These barriers are similar to those faced by female victims of
sexual violence – stigma, fear, shame, guilt, confusion and the need to focus
on immediate survival priorities. However, there may be additional barriers
that must be taken into account: the perceived need to live up to masculine
gender norms heightened as a result of war, a lack of cultural expressions or
terms to describe male sexual violence, or a perception that men and boys
simply cannot be victims of sexual violence. Thus, sensitive investigation and
prosecution practices are needed: these may mirror practices already in place
at the ICC, or additions may be required to address male-specific needs.
The second gap also requires sensitivity on the part of ICC staff and
officials. Investigators and prosecutors need to be aware of any incorrect
assumptions they, or individuals from whom they seek information (such as
medical or humanitarian personnel), hold about male sexual violence. Such
assumptions could include that rape is the only form of sexual violence, that
men cannot be victims of sexual violence, or that sexual violence is ‘personal’
156
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and not really connected to the main activity of war. The Office of the
Prosecutor will need to ensure adequate training of all staff in recognizing
and countering incorrect assumptions.
The ICC’s Prosecutor is best equipped to fill the third gap. While the
policy paper cannot change the crimes listed in the Rome Statute, and so
cannot directly address the gap in overt recognition, the policy can promote
consistent charging of male rape as such, and other forms of sexual violence
directed against men and boys as ‘sexual violence’ or ‘enforced sterilization’,
for example. It can also promote consistent explanation to the judges of how
and why particular acts are sexual, and why it is important for those acts to
be correctly labeled to capture the full nature of victimization. It can also
tackle the issue of whether secondary victimization (such as forcing an
individual to watch another individual being raped) is a form of sexual
violence.
The ICC Prosecutor’s policy paper can have a positive impact on
domestic prosecutions of international crimes. As at the international level,
there is also silence on male sexual violence at the domestic level.159 Thus, the
ICC Prosecutor’s policy paper could help inform domestic investigators and
prosecutors on best practices in this respect.160
This article ends where it began, on the theme of the volume: sexual
violence against men and boys, especially in detention, was recorded in
recent conflicts in Libya and Syria. The ICC has the opportunity to prosecute
this sexual violence (due to the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC by
the Security Council),161 thereby setting international precedent in drawing
attention to this form of violence. In addition, it is important that evidence of
male sexual violence continue to be gathered in the Syria situation, so that
future prosecutions –whether by the ICC162 or domestic courts – are possible.
Sexual violence against men and boys must no longer be “overlooked,
downplayed, or re-characterized” within international criminal law.163
In the meantime, social scientists, policy makers and advocates must
increase their understanding of each other and how each approaches the
collection and analysis of information. Mutual understanding can help
strengthen efforts to stop, prevent or redress the violence, either through
international prosecution or some other means.
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